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AdmiraltyCONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL LIMITED LIABILITY
ACT AND STATE STATUTE PERMITTING
DIRECT ACTION AGAINST INSURER
Five seamen were drowned when a towboat capsized in a Louisiana
river. The owner filed a petition to limit his liability pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Limitation Act,1 and the district court enjoined 2 all
suits against him, other than in the limitation proceeding, arising from this
occurrence. Subsequently, the seamen's representatives brought this action
against the owner's liability underwriters under the Louisiana Insurance
Code, which authorizes direct suit against the insurer "within the terms and
4
limits of the policy." 1 The action was dismissed by the district court,
but the circuit court reversed,5 holding that the state insurance statute was
not in conflict with the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court remanded the
case, granting a continuance until the limitation proceeding was completed.
One Justice was of the opinion that the direct actions should be allowed
only after the limitation proceeding; four Justices, who believed that these
actions should be dismissed, combined with him and agreed to remand so
that a majority could dispose of the litigation. Four Justices, however,
insisted that the direct actions should proceed without delay. Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
The Louisiana Statute has been interpreted to deprive insurers of the
insured's personal defenses. It is well settled that the defense of marital7
6
immunity is not open to the insurer, and it has been held that charitable
1. 49 STAT.960 (1935), 49 STAT. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1952) : "(a) The
liability of the owner of any vessel . . . for any loss, damage or injury done by
collision . . . incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners,
shall not . . . exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such
vessel and her freight then pending."
2. The issuance of an injunction is not necessary to stop proceedings in separate
or independent suits upon such claims, but the very nature of the proceeding has
the effect of a statutory injunction. The San Pedro, 223 U.S. 365 (1911). Power
to grant the injunction exists under 49 STAT. 1480 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1952) ;
see the provisions in ADmnzALTY RULES 51, 334 U.S. 864 (1947), 28 U.S.C. (1952).
3. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §22:655 (1951). Statutes with a similar purpose exist
in more than half of states, but they provide only for a direct action by a judgment
creditor. See discussion in Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 1949 INS.
L.J. 411, 414.
The policies involved in this case contained the usual provisions of indemnity
payment. As the statute is part of the policy, these provisions are of no effect.
Ruitz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
4. 99 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. La. 1952).
5. 198 F.2d 536 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 198 F.2d 1021 (1952).
6. E.g., Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935);
see Comment, 10 TULANE L. REv. 312 (1936).
7. Lusk v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 199 So. 666 (La. Ct. App.
1936).
(263)

264

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103

and municipal 8 immunity are also personal defenses on the theory that
the purpose of liability insurance is to protect the public rather than the
insured." This theory would prevent the marine insurer from asserting the
rights granted to the insured by federal legislation. The Federal Limitation
Act enables the ship owner to limit his liability for the acts of his
employees to ". . . the amount or value of the interest of such owner
in such vessel and her freight then pending." 10 The avowed purpose of
this statute was to encourage investment in shipping,1 and, while Congress
gave little guide for interpretation, the Act traditionally has been construed
in favor of ship owners. Thus stockholders have been held to be owners
within contemplation of the Act,1 2 and claims arising under subsequent
legislation such as the Jones Act "I and the Employers' Liability Act 14 have
been held subject to limitation. The decision in Norwich Co. v. Wright,15
that the liability of the owner was limited to the value of his "interest"
after the accident, restricted the ship owner's loss to his original investment in the ship, while the holding in Place v. Norwich & New York
TransportationCo., 1' that the proceeds of hull insurance were not part of
the owner's interest which was to be turned over to damage claimants,
enabled the owner to insure this investment. Although some loss through
personal liability still had to be met, the introduction of protection and
indemnity policies gave the ship owner complete coverage. When Congress
17
amended the Act in 1935 and 1936 these decisions were not altered.
However, the owner's liability was increased by establishing a minimum
8
liability of sixty dollars a ton in favor of personal injury claimants.'
In Louisiana, a direct action may be allowed before the limitation proceeding because, unlike direct action statutes in other states,"" the Louisiana
statute does not require the plaintiff to obtain a judgment against the
insured before instituting suit against the insurer. If this direct action
drained away all insurance receipts, in a subsequent limitation proceeding
the ship owner's liability insurance would prove useless because he would
be forced to pay a judgment there without insurance protection. In
effect, this would negate the theory of Place v. Norwich & New York
Transportation Co. that the shipper should be permitted to insure against
the loss of his investment. The ship owner who is in a position to self8. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 169 So. 132 (La.
Ct. App. 1936).
9. Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 199 La. 459, 6 So. 2d 351 (1942).
10. See note 1 supra.
11. Moore v. American Transp. Co., 24 How. 1 (U.S. 1860).
12. Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59 (1929).
13. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952); In re East River Towing
Co., 266 U.S. 355 (1924).
14. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952); The Passaic, 204 Fed. 266
(2d Cir. 1913).
15. 13 Wall. 104 (U.S. 1871).
16. 118 U.S. 468 (1886).
17. Springer, Amendments to the Federal Law Limiting the Liability of Shipowners, 11 ST. JOH s L. RBv. 14 (1936).
18. 49 STAT. 960 (1935), 49 STAT. 1479-80 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §183(b) (1952).
18a. See note 3 supra.
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insure could avoid this risk and gain all of the benefits of the Limitation
Act, but this would be impractical for smaller shippers who are in greater
need of encouragement. On the other hand, if the action is delayed until
the limitation proceeding has been completed, the owner can utilize insurance, but his cost of premiums is increased because the underwriter's liability
would be limited only by the value of the policy rather than the value of
the owner's interest after the accident. However, this would not affect
the policy of Norwich Co. v. Wright, as the purpose of that decision was
to protect the owner from out-of-pocket costs by limiting his loss to the
ship, rather than to minimize the cost of insurance. Congress has thus far
not decided whether the shipper should bear this cost. The 1936 amendments increased insurance costs by establishing a minimum liability, but
the legislature was unwilling to impute the master's knowledge to the owner
so as to curtail drastically the owner's right to limitation. 19 On the other
hand, proposals to place a maximum on the owner's liability were also
rejected.2°
The Limitation Act aided the development of American shipping by
encouraging men with capital to invest in an industry subject to a high risk
of loss. As the shipping industry becomes more firmly established, however, there is probably less reason to place it in a more favorable position
than other businesses. Inability to insure against even a limited liability
would be a substantial deterrent to investment in shipping, since similar
nonmaritime risks can be insured. On the other hand, the increase in
insurance costs effected by a liability equal to the owner's investment would
probably place shippers in no worse a position than other industries with
regard to insurance costs. Unless it is found that the increase is so burdensome as to substantially curtail investment in shipping, the ambiguity in
Congressional intent should be resolved in favor of personal injury claimants who cannot well bear the risk, and the action allowed to proceed upon
completion of the limitation proceeding.

CorporationsPROXYHOLDER'S VOTE FOR UNANNOUNCED
RESOLUTION DOES NOT BAR STOCKHOLDER'S
ACTION TO INVALIDATE
At a corporation's annual stockholders' meeting, a stockholder presented a resolution, which was adopted, that an acquisition of stock in a
rival corporation by the directors in their individual capacities should be
ratified and not considered a corporate opportunity. Previous to the meeting and in accord with SEC regulations, stockholders were sent proxy
statements which stated that management did not contemplate bringing
19. This provision was passed in 1935 but was repealed in 1936. See Hearings
before Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 4550, pt. 2, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 117-22 (1935).
20. Id. at 1-5, 92-93.
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up resolutions other than those enumerated,' and the resolution of ratification was not included. Plaintiff, a stockholder, signed a general proxy
which was voted in favor of the resolution. Plaintiff subsequently brought
a derivative action charging the directors with appropriating a corporate
opportunity. On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court
held that plaintiff's proxy vote in favor of the resolution did not estop her
from bringing the action, since she did not know that the disputed resolution would be presented. Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240 (Del. Ch.
1954).
At common law, all votes at a corporate stockholders' meeting were
required to be given in person. 2 As it became increasingly difficult to
procure the necessary quorum of stockholders, primarily because of distance or apathy,3 state statutes 4 and corporate charters and by-laws r authorized voting by proxy, thus facilitating transaction of business while
allowing absent stockholders to be represented in electing directors and
formulating corporate policy. The general proxy empowers the holder
to vote on all matters which might ordinarily arise at an annual meeting, even though there has been no mention of the resolution in the notice
of the meeting. 6 If the stockholder has no knowledge of a resolution and
his proxyholder votes to approve it, an unresolved problem is whether or
not the stockholder may institute a derivative suit 7 to question the validity
of the approved action. A rule is often stated that a proxyholder's vote
binds the absent stockholder to the same extent as if he had voted in person; 8 but in each supporting case additional factors were considered.
Where the proxyholder was a personally selected agent,9 the shareholder
was guilty of laches lO or acquiescence," or a third party relied on stockholder approval, 12 a total lack of knowledge did not prevent estoppel after
the proxy was voted in favor of ratification. Where management solicited
1. Facts of the directors' individual acquisitions were necessarily included in the
proxy statements because one enumerated resolution would ratify an investment by
the corporation in the rival's securities. See Schedule 14-A, Item 4(a) (directors
interests in matters to be acted upon), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4037,
December 18, 1947.
2. 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPOaxRONS §2050 (Perm. ed. 1952).
3. Investment Associates v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225,
235, 48 A.2d 501, 507, aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 595, 51 A.2d 572 (1946).
4. E.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1953).
5. 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORORATIONS § 2050 (Perm. ed. 1952).
6. Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 AtI. 136 (1933);
5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COuORaIONS §2060 (Perm. ed. 1952). See Tilden v.
Quaker Oats Co., 1 F.2d 160, 166 (7th Cir. 1924).
7. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 143 (Rev. ed. 1946).
8. 2 THOMPSON, COR'ORATIONS § 974 (3d ed. 1927).
9. Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories, 24 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1928).
10. McLean v. Bradley, 282 Fed. 1011 (N.D. Ohio 1922), aff'd, 299 Fed. 379

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 619 (1924).
11. Williams v. Wolf, 255 App. Div. 539, 8 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1st Dep't 1938).
12. Crook v. International Trust Co., 32 App. D.C. 490 (1909) (assignee of
capital stock subscription sued stockholder after call at meeting); Columbia Nat'l
Bank v. Mathews, 85 Fed. 934 (9th Cir. 1898) (corporate creditor sued stockholder
on personal liability).
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and voted the proxies, and no other estoppel factors were present, the determinative factor, particularly in ratification cases, 13 was whether the
shareholder knew or had reason to know of the resolution when signing
the proxy.'4
Because of many instances in which management controlled proxies
and stockholders who signed them had inadequate information, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 15 and subsequent regulations thereunder'16
require full disclosure in the proxy statement of proposed resolutions. That
requirement was fulfilled in the instant case, but the plaintiff had no
knowledge of the ratifying resolution because the presenting stockholder
had not submitted it to be placed on the "proxy statement. Whether or not
the statement contained a notice that management did not contemplate
bringing up other questions should not change the result, since management presumably had no knowledge of the resolution and did not present it.
If the stockholder is a straw-man of management, the holding of the instant
case prevents circumvention of SEC knowledge requirements. Presuming
a stockholder presents the resolution in good faith, the decision appears to
limit the binding power of a general proxy to those resolutions which the
stockholder knows will be presented. This could place an undesirable
premium on proxy voting, for the stockholder attending in person is
estopped by his acquiescence, while the stockholder attending by proxy
may have five years, as in the instant case, to watch a situation fostered
by his proxy before bringing action. The decision might also increase
the number of potential litigants who bring harassing suits, hoping that
the defendants will settle. If the present holding is limited to resolutions
which concern self-interested corporate officials, the necessity of protecting
the corporation and stockholders would be sufficient reason for requiring
full knowledge of both the transaction and the resolution of ratification
before invoking estoppel. Even a construction which includes all resolutions by management might be justified to protect stockholders, who have
few opportunities to challenge management action in many corporations.
But inclusion of all resolutions presented by attending stockholders would
facilitate the institution of costly litigation by any dissatisfied proxy-voter
and could discourage stockholder participation in formulating corporate
policy. Stockholders' knowledge of corporate affairs, attendance at meetings, and presentation of resolutions should be encouraged as protection for
themselves, the corporation, and the public. Prior submission of resolutions is desirable, but, when that is impossible, presentation at the meeting
is preferable to stockholder non-participation and should not be hampered.
13. "The essence of ratification is knowledge."

and Slareholder Ratification in Texas, 6

BAYLOR

Lebowitz, Director Misconduct

L. REv. 1, 26 (1953).

14. Blair v. F. H. Smith Co., 18 Del. Ch. 150, 156 Atl. 207 (1931).
15. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1952).
16. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1823, August 11, 1938; Release No.

4037, December 18, 1947.
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Declaratory JudgmentsFEDERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT PERMITS
COURT TO DETERMINE COMPULSORY NEGOTIABILITY
OF PROPOSALS UNDER RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The non-operating employees' of the Class I railroads of the United
States submitted notice of desired revisions and additions to the labor contract 2 between the parties on May 22, 1953. Among other things, the
unions' proposals included a broad welfare plan and free transportation
privileges on both home and foreign roads for employees and their immediate families. A national conference convened to consider the unions'
proposals as well as certain rules changes requested by the railroads. Negotiations collapsed on the second day of the conference when the railroads
refused to bargain on the welfare benefits or the transportation privileges,
which they charged were not properly negotiable under the Railway Labor
Act.3 The unions, without contesting that these proposals may not concern "rates of pay, rules, (or) working conditions," 4 maintained that the
proposals were properly negotiable whether or not compulsorily negotiable
and declined to discuss any of the other proposals. On the day the conference ended, the railroads filed a complaint requesting a federal district
court to grant a declaratory judgment that the two proposals do not involve
"rates of pay, rules, (or) working conditions" under the Act. Meanwhile,
the National Mediation Board failed to bring the parties together, and a
strike ballot was taken by the unions. While an Emergency Board appointed by the President of the United States 5 was investigating the dispute, the district court granted the unions' motion for dismissal of the pending complaint for failure to present a justiciable controversy. The Emergency Board summarily dismissed the doubt raised by the railroads that its
jurisdiction did not extend to these proposals if they are not within the
scope of compulsory negotiation as alleged in the railroads' complaint, with
the comment that the Board's jurisdiction included the dispute in its en6
tirety and that statutory construction is a problem for the courts. The
action of the district court dismissing the railroads' complaint was reversed
by the Seventh Circuit on August 10, 1954. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. v. Barnes, 215 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1954). Eleven days later
1. This group comprises all of the railroads' employees other than engine, train
See JONES, RAILROAD WAGES AND LABOR RELATIONS
1900-1952, 10-11 (1953). The group numbers upwards of a million and constitutes
almost three-fourths of all railroad employees.
2. Contracts between railroads and railway labor unions continue indefinitely
unless amended or supplemented. See § 6 of the Railway Labor Act for the procedure in making changes in the contracts. 44 STAT. 582 (1926), as amended, 48
STAT. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §156 (1952).
3. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1952).
4. The quoted phrase is used frequently throughout the Act, but in this case
the reference is particularly to § 2, First. See text at note 8 and note 8 nfra.
5. Exec. Order No. 10511, 19 FED. REG. 1 (1954).
6. REPORT TO THE PREsIDENT BY THE EmERGENCY BoARD, No. 106, p. 29 (May
and yard service personnel.

15, 1954).
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the dispute was settled by a compromise following the recommendations
of the Emergency Board. 7
The litigation intermeshed in this dispute centers on § 2, First of the
Railway Labor Act, which provides: "It shall be the duty of all carriers
. and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and
to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise. . . .,, 8 No sanctions are provided for enforcement,
but the court treats a 1936 Supreme Court decision 9 as holding that the
labor unions could have secured an injunction requiring the railroads to
bargain on these proposals if they concern "rates of pay, rules, (or) working conditions." Against this meager background of railway labor law,
the instant case must be categorized as justiciable or not. Jurisdiction under the Federal Declaratory judgment Act '0 is limited to cases that involve
an actual, legal controversy between adversary parties. The purpose of
the limitation is to avoid litigating cases in which the decision of the court
can accomplish no particular good," e.g., moot issues,' 2 problems based on
hypothetical facts,' 3 or cases tending toward advisory opinions through
lack of real adversaries.' 4 In deciding whether cases are justiciable, the
courts use various tests,' 5 of which one of the most important is a consideration of the ultimate effect of a decision on the controversy between
7
the parties.'8 Justice Jackson, in Public Service Commission v. Wycoff,'
reviewed the axioms employed in expressing the propriety of declaratory
relief and concluded that the matter is essentially one of degree, that the
court must "see what legal issues it is deciding, what effect its decision will
7. Agreements-August 21, 1954-In Settlement of Nonoperating Railway Labor
Organizations' Notice of May 22, 1953: Also Carriers' Rules Change Proposals;
Memorandum Regarding Health and Welfare Plan, August 21, 1954.
8. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1952).
9. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1936). The dispute in that case arose when the railroad refused to bargain with an organization
properly certified by the National Mediation Board under § 2, Ninth of the Railway
Labor Act, 48 STAT. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1952). The issue was
not the scope of obligatory bargaining, but rather the parties between whom bargaining was to take place.
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1952).
11. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 33-86 (2d ed. 1941).
12. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) ; Michael v. Cockerell,
161 F.2d 163 (4th Cir. 1947).
13. International Longshoremen's & Warehouseman's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S.
222 (1954) ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936).
14. Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, Inc., 323 U.S. 316 (1945).
15. Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HARV.
L. REv. 787, 794-96 (1949).
16. In Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgnments-1941-1949, 62 HARv.
L. REv. 787, 795 (1949), this concept is expressed in terms of "relative certainty
of ultimate coercive litigation." Anderson uses the phrase, a decree "conclusive in
character." 1 ANDERSON, AcTioNs FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 59 (1951).
17. 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
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have on the adversaries, and some useful purpose to be achieved in deciding
them." 18
The instant case presents an unusual situation in which the court is
asked to intervene on a matter that is related to but not an essential part
of the whole disagreement. A decision on whether these two proposals are
or are not obligatorily negotiable does not affect the right or power of the
unions to press their demapds under threat of a strike. Nothing in the
Railway Labor Act makes invalid or illegal a proposal which the court
might declare to be not within the language of the Act. Since, therefore,
a declaratory judgment action cannot bring a settlement of the controversy,
it is necessary to consider what effect a decision would have and what, if
any, useful purpose would be achieved by making it. Concurrently with
the litigation, the whole controversy advanced through the statutory procedures of the National Mediation Board and the Emergency Board until
a final settlement was reached eleven days after this court's decision. It is
through these boards that public opinion, the real sanction of the Railway
Labor Act, is focused.39 The net effect of a declaratory judgment in this
case would be to enhance the bargaining position of one of the parties before
these boards. Presumably a decision on the merits by a court of this
circuit would hold that the proposals are not "rates of pay, rules, (or)
working conditions" on the basis of a 1949 case which noted the narrow
scope of the statute. 20 This determination might detract from the weight
accorded to the proposals in the bargaining conferences. A contrary decision could be used only to bring the parties into conference, a circumstance
that prevailed before the boards throughout the period of litigation despite
the pending court action. There is no provision in either the Railway
Labor Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act that suggests that a court
should thus intervene to characterize proposals in a collective bargaining
dispute. The established settlement procedures have been successful in the
past,21 and no good reason appears for court action that does not facilitate
settlement. Before courts inject declaratory actions into these proceedings,
with the possible result of delay in final settlement pending the outcome in
trial and appellate courts, some more compelling reason should be found
than appears in the instant case.
18. Id. at 244.
19. General Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.., 320 U.S.
323, 328 (1943) ; Switchmen's Union of North Am. v. National Mediation Bd., 320
U.S. 297, 302 (1943); JONEs, RAILROAD WAGES AND LABOR RELATIONS 1900-1952,
86 et seq. (1953).
20. Inland Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 254-55 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). The issue presented was whether pensions were compulsorily negotiable under the National Labor Relations Act. The court compared
that Act with the Railway Labor Act and concluded, that the latter was very narrow
in its scope of compulsory negotiation.
21. The settlement procedures have seldom broken down in the 28 years since the
Railway Labor Act was passed. A two day nationwide strike in 1946 and three short
tie-ups of a few railroads from 1949 through 1952 required Presidential intervention.
But see JONES, RAILROAD WAGES AND LABOR RELATIONS 1900-1952, at 165-68 (1953).
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Labor LawNLRB MAY ORDER REINSTATEMENT OF SUPERVISORS
TO DISSIPATE § 8(a) (1) VIOLATION
An employer threatened his employees with reprisals and directed all
supervisors to thwart the union's organizational efforts within his small
plant. Two supervisors, upon whom the employer was relying heavily,
complied reluctantly and committed unfair labor practices.- The employer
warned these supervisors that unionization would cost them their jobs,
and some employees were aware of this threat. Promptly upon the union's
victory in NLRB elections, the supervisors were discharged for failure to
halt the union. The court of appeals affirmed the Board's finding 2 that,
within § 8(a) (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act,3 these discharges coerced nonsupervisory employees by causing them reasonably to fear similar treatment
if they continued to support the union, and enforced an order that the
employer cease and desist and reinstate the supervisors with back pay.
NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 213 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1954).
Under the Wagner Act, 4 supervisors were held to be "employees"; ,
therefore, their discharge for either union activity or refusal to commit unfair labor practices violated the Act, 6 and the Board had express authority,
pursuant to § 10(c), to order them reinstated as employees. 7 The TaftHartley amendment withdrew supervisors from employee coverage s but
left unaltered § 10(c) which authorizes the Board ". . . to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without
1. Even though these supervisors violated the Taft-Hartley Act, 49 STAT. 449
(1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1952), their
wrongdoing should not preclude recovery of their jobs. Cf. NLRB v. Thayer Co.,
213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 23 U.S.L. WEEK (U.S. Nov. 16, 1954) (strikers
who were wrongdoers reinstated).
2. 106 N.LR.B. No. 61 (July 22, 1953).
3. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7. . . ." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§158(a) (1) (1952) (The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947). Section 7
enumerates the right of employees to self-organization and other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
4. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1940).
5. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), affirming, 157 F.2d
80 (6th Cir. 1946), enforcing Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
6. Such discharges violated both §§8(1) and 8(3) of the Wagner Act, 49
STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1940), the latter because of the discriminatory
discharge of an "employee," and the former due to the coercion of employees. See
note 7 infra.
7. See NLRB v. Vail Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1947); NLRB v.
Richter's Bakery, 140 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1944) ; cf. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting
Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1941).
8. This was accomplished in three steps: § 2(3) expressly excludes supervisors
from the term "employee"; supervisors are separately defined in § 2(11) ; and § 14
provides that no employer whose activities affect interstate commerce is under any
legal obligation to deem supervisors employees for the purposes of any law relating
to collective bargaining.
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back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act." 9 The purpose of a
§ 10(c) order is to remove the unwholesome effects of an unfair practice by
reassuring the employees of their collective bargaining rights,10 and the
phrase "reinstatement of employees" merely illustrates and does not limit
the Board's power." Thus, in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 2 the
Supreme Court validated an order requiring an employer to hire applicants
discriminatorily denied employment, the Court assuming in an alternative
holding that the applicants were not "employees." 13 Noting this, the
Board in previous cases has held that the discharge of supervisors for
refusal to violate the amended Act still coerces the nonsupervisory employees and, to secure the employees' rights, has ordered the supervisors
reinstated with back pay. 4 The instant court is the first to pass squarely
on this ruling.' 5
Supervisors were withdrawn from employee coverage in order to
better equalize the collective-bargaining process by assuring management
that supervisors would be free from union domination. 16 Since the Talladega case does not abrogate the rule that supervisors may be discharged
for pro-union activity,' 7 their independence seems secure; moreover, a
supervisor's mere refusal to commit an illegal act does not amount to disloyalty. In fact, so long as an employer does not insist upon unfair labor
practices, he may still demand animosity toward the union as a requisite
of supervisory employment. In dissipating the effects on employees of an
unfair practice, the Board may prevent an employer's enjoyment of any

advantage gained by his violation,' but it may not prescribe "penalties."

:9

9. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1952).
10. Frank Brothers Co. v.NLRB,321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944).
11. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941), 90 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 105, 106.
12. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
13. Id. at 191. The Court held, however, that the applicants were "employees."
See Feinberg, Reinstatement and Back Pay---The Phelps Dodge Case, 42 COL.
L. REv. 443, 448-49 (1942).
14. Inter-City Advertising Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1950), rev'd on other grounds,
190 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1951). Accord, Irving Weissman, 27 L.R.R.M. 1539 (1951);
Salant & Salant, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 343 (1950).
15. Other courts enforced Board orders requiring reinstatement of supervisors
in cases decided after the 1947 amendment, but did not pass affirmatively on the
Board's position. See, e.g., Eastern Coal Corp. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.
1949); NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), rev'd on
other grounds, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). In Inter-City Advertising Co. v. NLRB, 190
F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1951), the court reversed the Board's finding of fact and did not
reach the legal question involved.
16. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-17 (1947); SEN. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1947).
17. NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising Co., 190 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1951) ; NLRB
v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948). See also cases cited
in 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 112 n,30 (1951).
18. Frank Brothers Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944); National Licorice
Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 365 (1940).
19. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); Triplex Screw Co.
v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1941). Each decision invalidated a Board order
requiring employer, who had discriminatorily discharged employees, to reimburse a
second employer for wages paid by the latter to these employees prior to reinstatement.
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To reassure the Talladega employees of their rights, it may be suggested
that a cease and desist order would have sufficed since, regardless of their
fear of continued supervisory surveillance, the employees would have realized their immunity from discriminatory discharges. However, other employers in a similar situation would not have been deterred from accepting
a cease and desist order in exchange for the opportunity to dismiss supervisors and, if a union lost the election, delay its entry. This incentive
would be especially great in large plants where, because of the infrequency
of contacts between top management and employees, unfair practices
usually are committed by supervisors. Under the Talladega decision, a
supervisor will be less prone to violate the Act, because he realizes that he
will be reinstated if discharged for refusing to do so; under a mere cease
and desist order, he would have been forced to choose between breaking
the law and losing his job, with no common law remedy available.2 0 Therefore, the reinstatement with back pay order will better effectuate the policies
of the Act because it places the parties in their former positions and deprives
the employer of the benefits of his illegal conduct.

Res JudicataCONTINUING ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY HELD TO
CONSTITUTE ONE "CAUSE OF ACTION"
In 1942 several film advertising distributors sued another advertising
distributor and three film producers under the Sherman and Clayton Acts 1
for treble damages and an injunction, charging a conspiracy to monopolize
the distribution of advertising materials and alleging that the defendantdistributor had received the exclusive right 2 to distribute the producers'
materials and had acted pursuant to this conspiracy.3 That suit was dismissed when the plaintiffs accepted a consent judgment with prejudice in
return for a contract providing that the defendant would supply them with
materials.4 In 1949 plaintiffs instituted the present antitrust action against
the previous defendants and other producers for an injunction and for
damages incurred since the first suit. They alleged that the exclusive contracts were still in effect 5 and that new acts to monopolize the trade had
taken place since dismissal. 6 These acts included deliberately making late
20.

MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 546

(4th ed. 1952).

1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952) (Sherman Antitrust Act) ; 38
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952) (Clayton Act).
2. Complaint, allegations 22, 42, 44 (1942).

3. Id., allegations 24, 26, 34, 35, 39, 41, 44, 46, 49, 50, 52.
4. Amended Complaint, allegation 53f (1950).
5. Id., allegations 24, 53c. Similar contracts were alleged between the defendantdistributor and defendant-producers other than the original three. See allegations
53h, 54c and 56c.
6. Id., allegations 30, 35-37, 44, 45.
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delivery of materials to the plaintiff and manipulating prices to undersell
him.7 The court held that the prior dismissal barred the present action
under the doctrine of res judicata, since both suits attacked essentially the
same course of conduct and thus were based on the same cause of action.
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954),
cert. granted, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 3092 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1954).
Within the general doctrine of res judicata it is important to distinguish
the effect of a judgment upon a subsequent suit between the parties based
on the same cause of action from its effect on another suit between them
based on a different cause of action.8 If the cause of action is different and
a particular issue was actually decided in the first suit, the rule of collateral
estoppel dictates that the parties are bound in any future suit between them
in which the issue may arise. If the cause is the same,9 even though no issue
was actually decided in the first adjudication the later suit is barred by
what might be called a "technical" res judicata. A consent judgment constitutes adjudication for this purpose.10 Whether res judicata in this
technical sense applies to a suit involving a continuing conspiracy depends
on how "cause of action" is interpreted. Precedent is scarce and analogy
to continuing nuisance or continuing trespass is not helpful.,1
In Van
Brode Milling Co. v. Kellogg Co.,' 2 a district court held that dismissal for
failure to prosecute 18 a claim which alleged conspiracy to restrain trade
would not bar the same allegations 14 in a later action between the parties
because the cause of action in the prior suit consisted only of matters in
existence up to that time. However, there is dictum in another district
court decision 15 to the effect that a continuing conspiracy in restraint
of trade creates only one legal wrong, and thus suits against the conspiracy
over different periods of time are based on the same cause of action. 16
7. Id., allegations 30, 35, 36.
8. Cleary, Res Judicata, Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 342 (1948); Scott,
Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HAxv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1942).
9. See Developments in, the Law-Res Judcata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 824
(1952).
10. United States v. Parker, 120 U.S. 89 (1887); Burns v. Fincke, 197 F.2d
165 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Urbino v. Puerto Rico Light & Power Co., 164 F.2d 12
(1st Cir. 1947).
11. Plaintiff's consent to having defendant's structure on his land renders the
invasion no longer a trespass, while consent, even in a judgment, to a conspiracy in
restraint of trade does not make the conspiracy any more desirable.
12. 113 F. Supp. 845 (D. Del. 1953).
13. Since the order of dismissal did not otherwise specify, it operated as an
adjudication on the merits under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
14. Restraint in rice cereals was alleged in a dismissed counterclaim and restraint
in all cereals in a later action. The broader coverage of the second allegation is
immaterial since the court assumed that the counterclaim was compulsory, thus
barring all matters such as restraint in all cereals, which could have been adjudicated.
15. United States v. Gypsum Co., 51 F. Supp. 613, 622 (D.D.C. 1943).
16. As support, the court cites Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, 201 Fed.
306 (2d Cir. 1912) in which a suit for damages based on alleged illegal price-fixing
agreements was barred by dismissal of a prior suit challenging these agreements
over a different period of time. However, since the legality of the agreements had
been decided against the plaintiff in the first suit, this decision could have been based
on collateral estoppel.
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Previous to the Lawlor decision neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit
court had considered the problem.
An interpretation of "cause of action" for the purpose of applying res
judicata to all continuing conspiracies can be evaluated only after examining
the various grounds on which an adverse adjudication in the first suit
may be based. If the original dismissal was for failure to state an actionable
claim, a future suit is undesirable if based on the same allegations or on
allegations which, though altered, do not constitute a substantial change.
However, relitigation of the issue of law could be prevented by application
of collateral estoppel withotit resort to "technical" res judicata.17 If, instead, the plaintiff's proof had been insufficient in the first suit and now he
offers sufficient evidence which is available because of defendant's subsequent conduct, the second action should be allowed or the plaintiff may be
injured continually with no private redress. The same is true if the first
suit was lost by a consent judgment or any other type of dismissal with
prejudice without litigation and determination of any issue.18 The Lawlor
decision not only permits the defendants to repeat those acts which occurred before the first suit, but also grants immunity to any acts which can
be considered "essentially the same course of conduct." Since this phrase
is undefined, the extent to which the pattern of new acts may vary from the
old is unknown, and different courts may well create divergent interpretations. On the other hand, if suit is permitted in these situations there
is a danger that, despite the high cost of antitrust actions, 19 the plaintiff
may attempt to harass the defendant by bringing frequent new suits; but
the solution to that problem does not lie in res judicata which bars justified
as well as unjustified litigation. Other judicial procedures such as tort
action for abuse of process and wrongful civil proceeding 20 may compensate
harassed defendants, while the court can always tax costs if the plaintiff
employs dilatory tactics. 21 In an overall evaluation, even if these procedures are inadequate to deter harassment, the penalties to a potential
plaintiff are so severe that "technical" res judicata should not be utilized,
especially in the antitrust field in which suits by private parties are a
potent factor in enforcement. 22 The social value of these actions has been
held to outweigh the policy against permitting a party to an illegal contract
17. See Scott, mipra note 9 at 7-10.
18. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 41 dismissal with prejudice may be by consent judgment, voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff of a claim once dismissed, or failure to
prosecute or comply with the Rules or any order of court.
19. See Note, Antitrust Enforcenwt by Private Parties: Analysis of Developstents in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1034 n.166, 1056 (1952).
20. PaossER, To RTs §§ 97, 98 (1941).
21. Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 CoL.

L. REv. 78, 93 (1953).
22. See Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties, 61 YALE L.J. 1010,
1061-62 (1952).
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to sue on it.2 Thus it may be that a contract prohibiting future suit against
24
Yet
a conspiracy in restraint of trade is void as against public policy.
the instant case permits the same effect by a consent judgment.

WitnessesCRIMINAL SYNDICATES AND THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
During a grand jury investigation of county-wide gambling and
bribery, an attorney claimed the attorney-client privilege and refused to
answer certain questions concerning the past activities of his late client. In
subsequent contempt proceedings arising out of the attorney's refusal, the
lower court approved the claim of privilege and the appellate court
affirmed.' The state supreme court reversed, holding that the evidence adduced by the state, consisting of (1) client's statement to defendant concerning his past acts of bribing state officials, (2) testimony concerning
client's visit to the State Republican Chairman to protest the continued
closing of his gambling places, and (3) evidence that client had consulted
defendant more thar two hundred times within a year when client was
neither under arrest-nor indictment, established a prima facie case that the
consultations were sought by client to aid him in the perpetration of future
crimes and, therefore, were not privileged. In re Selser, 105 A.2d 395
(N.J. 1954).
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote free discussion between an attorney and his client by assuring the client that his attorney will not be compelled to testify about confidences.2 But, once it is
established that the client's purpose in seeking legal advice was to aid him
in perpetrating future crime or fraud, the privilege is abrogated and the
attorney must testify.8 As to the quantum of evidence which the state must
adduce, most American courts quote with approval the language of Jus23. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1945). Similarly, the courts have
held res judicata less important than private litigation of illegal patents. Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944); 57 HAav. L.
REv. 574; Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) ; Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1946). But see
Justice Roberts' dissent in the Mercoid case, supra at 675.
24. See Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117,
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Cf. Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co.,
329 U.S. 394, 402 (1947) (an agreement not to challenge the vaidity of a patent is
unenforceable); D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114 (1946) (Since the
Fair Labor Standards Act allows suit by an employee against his employer for unpaid
wages plus liquidated damages, agreement not to sue for the latter is unenforceable.
This liquidated damage provision is analogous to the treble damage provision of the
Clayton Act.).
1. 27 N.J. Super. 257, 99 A.2d 313 (1953).
2. 8 WIm ORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 at 550-52 (3d ed. 1940) ; 1 THORNTON, ATTORNEY
AT LAW

159-60 (1914).

3. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); Matthews v. Hoagland, 48
N.J. Eq. 455, 469, 21 Atl. 1054, 1059 (Ch. 1891). See Notes, 125 A.L.R. 509 (1940);
5 A.L.R. 997 (1920).
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tice Cardozo in Clark v. United States,4 that "to drive the privilege away
'there must be something to give color to the charge'; there must be 'prima
facie evidence that has some foundation in fact.'" This language was taken
from an earlier English case - which used the word "charge" to refer to
the accusation that the consultations were improper and not to the charge
or indictment under which the client was tried. Nevertheless, several
recent decisions 1 might be interpreted as applying the Clark test to the
indictment. Such a practice would ease the state's burden considerably,
for ordinarily it is less difficult to establish that the client has committed a
crime or fraud than to show that the consultations were for an unlawful
purpose. Especially in criminal cases, where a prima facie case of defendant's guilt often is shown as a matter of course, the effect is to vitiate the
privilege. On the other hand, to limit the state to evidence directly relating
to the consultations seems needlessly restrictive. The most reasonable
rule would require the state to introduce some evidence concerning the
consultations and allow evidence of client's criminal acts to be used to lend
support to its case. 7 The problem of sufficiency of evidence was treated
most fully in Securities Exchange Commission v. Harrison" in which the
SEC applied to a district court for an order compelling the attorney to
testify in an investigation charging client with instigating a suit in order
to escape performance of a contract. The Commission introduced evidence
of client's intent manifested by his inquiry concerning possible damages-for
breach, and by records of client's calls and an associate's visit to the attorney who subsequently filed the suit in question. The court held this insufficient evidence of collusion, since it was equally consonant with a
legitimate investigation to ascertain whether a derivative suit had been
started. 9 The evidence in the instant case would seem sufficient under
the Harrisonapproach. While the unusual number of consultations could
be explained by the fact that during this period five of client's associates
were under arrest and client had been subpoenaed by the Kefauver Committee,' 0 when considered with the additional evidence of client's admitted
4. 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
5. O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604. "But it is not enough to allege
fraud. If the communications to the solicitor were for the purpose of obtaining
professional advice, there must be, in order to get rid of the privilege, not merely an
allegation that they were made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission
of fraud, but there must be something to give colour to the charge." See also
comment to Rule 212, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), incorporated in Rule 26,
§2(a), UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE (1953).
6. United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589
(1939) ; State v. Childers, 196 La. 554, 199 So. 640 (1940).
7. See People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 270
N.Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1st
Dep't 1934).
8. 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rehearing denied, 87 D.C. App. 232, 184
F.2d 691, cert. granted and proceedings dismissed, 340 U.S. 908 (1951).
9. Cf. Atlantic Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Goss, 50 Ga. App. 637, 179 S.E. 420

(1935).

See 37 GEo. L.J. 431, 433 (1949).

10. The Committee's authority is derived from SEN. Ras. 202, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1950).
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briberies and his visit to the State Republican Chairman the more reasonable conclusion is that the consultations were for an unlawful purpose. 1
But, even though the privilege be abrogated, the defendant should not be
compelled to reveal the names of state officials who were recipients of
client's bribes. These were acts perpetrated before defendant's employment and are not subject to inquiry, for the consultations could not possibly
have aided the client in their commission. 12
The court took judicial notice of the problem of nation-wide criminal
syndicates. 13 Other authorities concerned with the problem of the privilege
being used to protect criminal activities have suggested that either the
privilege be abolished 14 or else the evidentiary requirements changed. 15
The American Bar Association's Committee on the Improvement of the
Rules of Evidence has recommended that in all cases involving "organized
criminal syndicates" the privilege be abolished.' 6 Aside from the problem
of formulating a workable definition for this group, there would seem to be
good reason for leaving the privilege intact. Too often procedural safeguards are attacked because they afford protection to unpopular elements
of our society, a case in point being the assault upon the Fifth Amendment
as a shield for communists. Such basic protections 17 should not be
destroyed merely because they increase the burden of the state.' 8 Before
such action is taken, it must be shown that under the present rule of evidence the state is unable to secure the desired testimony. The instant
decision belies such a condition, and it would seem that in those cases
in which the attorney was closely associated with criminal syndicates
competent police investigation can produce sufficient evidence to establish
the prima facie case. A danger of removing even as invidious a group as
criminal syndicates from the protection of the privilege is that once the
erosion commences it may be difficult to contain, and what was an exception
11. The court's language is unnecessarily broad. At 405 it is stated that: "any
one of these three items of proof would suffice to 'give color' to the State's charge
of fraud and to provide 'prima facie evidence that it had some foundation in fact."'
12. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891). See also 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2298 at 574 (3d ed. 1940).
13. Instant case at 399. See SEN. RE. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-7, 181-86
(1951); SEN. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5, 37-38 (1951); KEFAUVER,
CRIME IN

AmERICA

(1951).

14. Judge Seabury has suggested that in all cases involving public officials the
privilege be abolished. 8 WIGioRE, EVIDENCE § 2299 at 581 (3d ed. 1940).
15. Wigmore suggests that in all cases where the state has introduced "some
evidence of crime or fraud" the burden be shifted to the attorney to show that the
consultations were for a legitimate purpose. Id. at 580. While this proposal has the
merit of preserving the privilege, it poses the problem of how the attorney can carry
the burden without revealing the very confidences he seeks to protect.
16. 8 WIGoRE, EVIDENCE § 2299, at 582 (3d ed. 1940).
17. Compare Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928), with Griswold, The Fifth Amendment: An Old and Good Friend, 40 A.B.A.J. 502 (1954).
18. Hoffman, Whom Are We Protecting? Some Thoughts on the Fifth Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J. 582 (1954). Athough this article concerns the privilege against
self-incrimination its conclusions seem equally valid in regard to the attorney-client
privilege.
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to the privilege's scope may become the rule. Furthermore, such a procedure would tend to prevent lawful consultations, for it would seem that
once the state shows that the client is a member of a criminal syndicate
the attorney must reveal even confidences of a lawful nature as long as
they were relevant to the inquiry. Moreover, the abolition of the attorneyclient privilege in this limited area may not produce the attorney's testimony, for if he has participated in any unlawful acts he could claim the
privilege against self-incrimination. To date, a good faith claim of the latter has not been held grounds for disbarment, 19 and it is doubtful that
concern for reputation will induce the attorney to testify when the alternative is possible criminal prosecution. If recent legislation, 20 which allows
Congressional committees and grand juries investigating subversive activities to grant immunity from federal prosecution, is extended to include
investigations of criminal syndicates as well, it may have the effect of
obviating the attorney-client privilege. It may be argued that, if the client
is granted immunity from criminal prosecution, the attorney has no right
to remain silent, since the privilege is only for his client's protectionm2
However, a military court in United States v. Fair22 has held that the
attorney-client privilege is broader than the privilege against self-incrimination, inferring it includes preservation of reputation as well, and therefore
an attorney will not be compelled to testify even though his client is safe
from criminal prosecution. Even if this decision is not followed in the
civil courts, the attorney might claim the privilege on the ground that
under the new immunity act his testimony could be used to convict his
client of perjury.P
19. See Note, 127 A.L.R. 1280 (1940); Note, The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination as Affecting Public Officers and Attorneys, 15 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
47, 57 (1940). But compare Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment, 39 A.B.A.J. 1084
(1953), with Brown, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: A Dissent, 40 A.B.A.J.
404 (1954).
20. Pub. L. No. 600, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1954), amending 62 STAT.
833 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1952). The original bill included criminal syndicates
as well. This was recommended by the Senate committee investigating crime. See
SFN. REP. No. 307, supra note 15, Recommendation No. 18. For debates on this
act see 100 CONG. REc. 12602 et seq. (Aug. 4, 1954). For constitutional ranifications see 18 AXBANY L. Ray. 173 (1954).
21. 8 WIzoRoa, EVIDENC: § 2290 at 548 (3d ed. 1940) and cases cited.
22. 2 U.S. Ct. Mil. App. 521, 10 C.M.R. 19 (1953). Criticized in 6 STAN. L.
REv. 363 (1954).
23. PuB. L. No. 600, § (d), supra note 20.

